Agreement-level data from Baccini, Dur and Elsig (2015) on the number of flexibility provisions (safeguards, suspension of tariff cuts, anti-dumping and countervailing duties) in 559 preferential trade agreements, 1945–2009. The top category (all four provisions) holds 46 percent of agreements and mixes step-by-step insurance-seeking members with members adopting maximum flexibility at once for protectionist reasons: the top-inflated ordered outcome analyzed by Bagozzi, Joo and Mukherjee (2024, Table 1). Rows are the complete cases of that specification.
Usage
data(pta)Format
A data frame with 559 rows and 11 variables:
- agreement
Agreement name.
- year
Year of signature.
- flexibility
Number of escape-flexibility provisions, 0–4 (the ordered outcome).
- depth
Depth of trade-liberalization commitments (index).
- gdp
Log GDP of the member states.
- gdppc
Log GDP per capita.
- trade
Log imports plus exports.
- democracy
1 if the least democratic member has a Polity IV score above 5.
- gattwto
1 if all members are GATT/WTO members.
- members
Number of member states.
- democratization
1 if at least one member democratized over the previous ten years.
Source
Baccini, L., Dur, A. and Elsig, M. (2015). The politics of trade agreement design: Revisiting the depth-flexibility nexus. International Studies Quarterly, 59, 765-775 (replication data); as analyzed in Bagozzi, B.E., Joo, M.M. and Mukherjee, B. (2024). Top-category inflation in ordered international relations outcomes. Foreign Policy Analysis, 20, orae006 (replication archive, Harvard Dataverse).
Provenance and terms
Taken from the public replication archive of the cited article and
redistributed here, with the variables renamed and recoded as documented in
data-raw/make_data.R, so that the published results can be reproduced;
the archive states the original terms of use.
See also
iop(); vignette("iop") and vignette("model") analyze these
data.
Other datasets:
bp,
repression
Examples
data(pta)
table(pta$flexibility)
#>
#> 0 1 2 3 4
#> 66 66 80 92 255
m <- iop(flexibility ~ depth * democracy + gdp + gdppc + trade + gattwto + members +
democratization | gdp + gdppc + democracy + democratization,
data = pta, inflate = "top")
#> The inflation equation contains no covariate that is excluded from the outcome equation; the split is then identified by functional form alone. An exclusion restriction is advisable.
summary(m)
#>
#> Inflated ordered probit (inflated category: 4)
#> Call: iop(formula = flexibility ~ depth * democracy + gdp + gdppc +
#> trade + gattwto + members + democratization | gdp + gdppc +
#> democracy + democratization, data = pta, inflate = "top")
#> Response levels (in order): 0 < 1 < 2 < 3 < 4
#> N = 559 inference: analytic
#>
#> Outcome equation (ordered probit):
#> Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
#> depth 0.076095 0.011150 6.824 8.83e-12 ***
#> democracy 0.233859 0.202387 1.156 0.24788
#> gdp 0.123126 0.054717 2.250 0.02443 *
#> gdppc -0.198259 0.093155 -2.128 0.03332 *
#> trade -0.050652 0.029668 -1.707 0.08776 .
#> gattwto 0.222431 0.141240 1.575 0.11529
#> members -0.001499 0.007050 -0.213 0.83165
#> democratization -0.386944 0.161517 -2.396 0.01659 *
#> depth:democracy -0.032583 0.012046 -2.705 0.00683 **
#>
#> Cutpoints:
#> Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
#> 0|1 0.1440 1.0281 0.140 0.8886
#> 1|2 0.7472 1.0275 0.727 0.4671
#> 2|3 1.3770 1.0282 1.339 0.1805
#> 3|4 2.1091 1.0363 2.035 0.0418 *
#>
#> Inflation equation (P(ordered regime); inflated category "4", observed share 0.456, mean fitted P(ordered regime) 0.764):
#> Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
#> (Intercept) -0.9215 1.3383 -0.689 0.491090
#> gdp 0.4359 0.1192 3.658 0.000254 ***
#> gdppc -0.7506 0.2282 -3.290 0.001002 **
#> democracy -1.3982 0.3824 -3.657 0.000256 ***
#> democratization -0.7269 0.3531 -2.059 0.039512 *
#> ---
#> Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
#> logLik = -704.11 AIC = 1444.21 BIC = 1522.08 df = 18